·5 min read·

Reuse is the feature, not the afterthought

On 9 July a single Falcon 9 booster flew for the 36th time, a reuse record. The number is impressive on its own, but the useful part is the discipline behind it, and what it says about building systems designed to be flown again.

On 9 July, SpaceX flew the booster B1067 for the 36th time, launching 29 Starlink satellites from Cape Canaveral and landing the stage on a drone ship in the Atlantic (Spaceflight Now, 2026). It was the most flights any Falcon 9 first stage has made. The same booster first flew in June 2021 on a cargo run to the space station, then carried two crewed missions, then two dozen Starlink batches, and it is still going. That is the record. The more interesting thing is the habit underneath it.

Designing for the second flight.

A booster that flies 36 times is not a booster that got lucky. It is one that was designed from the start to be inspected, refurbished and flown again, where the second flight was a requirement rather than a hope. Everything follows from that decision: the margins you leave in the structure, the parts you make serviceable, the data you capture on every flight so you know what to check before the next one. Reuse is not something you bolt on to a vehicle built to be thrown away. It is a property you design in, or you never get.

The scale is the proof. SpaceX has now landed boosters more than 630 times, and there are over 10,700 Starlink satellites in orbit off the back of that cadence (Spaceflight Now, 2026). None of that volume is possible if each launch consumes a new rocket. The reuse is what makes the rest affordable.

The same choice, in software.

We build operational systems that have to keep running for years, and the pattern is identical. The expensive systems are the ones built for the demo and never for the second year: the ones where nobody left room to service them, where the logs do not tell you what went wrong, where every change is a rebuild rather than a swap. They fly once, impressively, and then the cost of the next flight is the whole thing again.

The durable ones are built the other way. You assume the system will be maintained, so you make the parts serviceable. You assume it will fail somewhere, so you instrument it to tell you where. You assume the requirements will move, so you leave margin. None of that is glamorous, and none of it shows up in the first launch. It shows up on the thirty-sixth.

What it actually asks of you.

The catch is that reuse costs more up front. Building something to be flown again is slower and more careful than building it to fly once, and on the first flight the two look the same from the outside. The discipline is spending that extra effort before you have any evidence you will need it, on the belief that you will. A studio that ships its own products lives with that belief directly, because we are the ones who have to service the thing next year.

The booster is a good reminder because the maths is so stark. Thirty-six flights from one stage is not a story about a clever launch. It is a story about a decision made years earlier, to treat the vehicle as something that comes back. The systems worth building are the ones designed to come back too.

Talk to Remiam about a system like this.